Buy Here Pay Here Akron Ohio
If you have bad credit, getting approved for an auto loan from a bank or outside source can be nearly impossible. Fortunately, our buy here pay here auto dealerships offer in-house financing. Now, you can purchase directly through us, without the hassle and rejections from a third-party lender.
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At Buckeye Auto Network in Akron, we can help you purchase your next preowned vehicle no matter your credit situation. We work with multiple banks and lenders to give you options. With the addition of our buy here pay here program, we are proud to say we have credit for you!
If finding a bad credit car loan in Akron has been wearing you down, it might be time to change your tactics. We can help you look for a buy here pay here (BHPH) car lot in Akron that doesn't need you to jump through all the hoops of regular financing. At these dealers, all you need to get qualified for a car loan is a steady income.
The dealers are the lenders at buy and pay here lots, which is why it's also known as in-house financing. Because they don't need outside sources to get you financed, these dealers often don't check your credit. This can be a blessing if your credit is at the bottom of the barrel, but it can be a curse as well, because dealers that don't check credit aren't as likely to report to the credit bureaus. Without your payments being reported to the national credit bureaus, your car loan won't help you improve your credit score.
The quality vehicles in our used car inventory are in demand and sell quickly, of course. But on any given day, it's not uncommon to shop here and find some of the world's best-selling pickups at great pre-owned prices. We're talking about trucks like a used Ford F-150, Chevy Silverado 1500, a used Ram 1500 or GMC pickup. You can also shop here and find quality used SUV's from great names like Jeep, Honda, Toyota, Hyundai, BMW and Audi.
The Haasz Automall Finance Department staff are ready to help you in finding the best financing options to fit your needs. They can answer all of your questions and concerns regarding car loans, auto financing, lease options and APR rates for new and used vehicles. Let us help you find the interest rate, payment and loan schedule that fits your lifestyle. Get your purchase process started today! You can get pre-approved by filling out our online credit application. It is secure and free, and you have no obligation to purchase after you apply. We work with over 30 lenders and have in-house buy-here-pay-here, we will do everything in our power to put together a financing deal that gets you in a vehicle. Good credit, bad credit - we are here to help! Have questions about your credit? Check out our Credit FAQ above or call us at 1-855-482-5958.
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This is an antitrust case. The plaintiff here, Dunham's Inc., a Michigan corporation, is a retail seller of sporting goods. Three separate defendants are named: *618 NBS, a Texas corporation; Michigan Sporting Goods Distributors, Inc. (MC Sporting Goods), a Michigan corporation; and Figgie International Company, an Ohio corporation.[1]
NBS operates a syndicate or buying group composed of various sporting goods retailers throughout the United States. NBS advertises that it has members in 47 states. The buying syndicate operates in the following manner. It purchases, or arranges for purchases, of sporting goods merchandise between manufacturers or wholesalers and members of the NBS buying syndicate. These purchases are made in large quantity at discounted prices. Therefore, NBS members are able to buy these goods at prices less than what they would have to pay wholesalers in the normal course of their business. By obtaining merchandise at discount prices, NBS members are able to sell their goods at more competitive prices while still making an attractive profit. In short, NBS's operation apparently offers members the opportunity to buy merchandise at lower than normal prices and thereby gain a competitive advantage in the marketplace over non-NBS member retailers.
It is essential to understand NBS's mode of operation insofar as it can be gleaned from the parties' submissions. A letter and brochure sent to plaintiff by NBS on December 28, 1983 explains the NBS membership requirements and operations. Plaintiff's Exhibit A. NBS members are required to pay a one-time initiation fee of $1,000. In addition to this, members must pay monthly dues of $175. There are also certain registration fees of $150 per member.
If jurisdiction in this case had been predicated on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332, there would have been no argument from counsel that an International Shoe "minimum contacts" analysis would be necessary. But jurisdiction here is based on federal antitrust statutes, supra. The parties' disagreement on the "minimum contacts" question is further complicated by the fact that in an antitrust action, nationwide service of process is permitted on corporate defendants. 15 U.S.C. 22. Therefore, the question this court must decide is whether an International Shoe minimum contacts analysis must be undertaken when jurisdiction is predicated on federal antitrust statutes and nationwide service of process is provided for over the corporate defendants.
The court reviewed the traditional two-step analysis whereby federal courts sitting in diversity first determine whether a state long-arm service of process exists, and then whether requiring the defendant to appear in the forum is consistent with due process principles. Id. at 822. Further, the court said it was unable to find any cases applying the minimum contact-due process test in situations involving federal receivership statutes and nonresident defendants. In making its ruling, the court's rationale was based on the fact that an ancillary receivership action does not involve a court attempting to extend its power beyond its own territorial limitations through a state's long-arm statute. Instead, the court reasoned, a different analysis must be applied.
The Sixth Circuit's analysis in Haile was based, in large part, on the First Circuit *621 case of Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, (D.R.I.1977), modified on other grounds, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114, 99 S. Ct. 1016, 59 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1978). In that case, defendants, who were nonresidents, were served under a nationwide service of process statute, 28 U.S.C. 1391(e). Defendants argued that the court could not exercise its personal jurisdiction over them based on due process grounds. While rejecting this argument, the court said that since Congress specifically authorized personal jurisdiction over defendants located anywhere in the United States in 28 U.S.C. 1391(e), personal jurisdiction over the defendants was proper. A portion of the district court opinion, not reversed by the First Circuit, is especially pertinent to the question presented in the present case. In relevant part, the court stated:
Under this rationale, the Haile court concluded that the proper inquiry is whether service was "reasonably calculated" to inform the defendants of the action against them so that they might have an opportunity to be heard, rather than an analysis under the International Shoe line of cases. The court held: "In an action where service of process is effected pursuant to a federal statute which provides for nationwide service of process, the strictures of International Shoe do not apply." 657 F.2d at 824. Because the statute involved in Haile, 28 U.S.C. 1692, provided for nationwide service of process,[5] the court's process extended to any district where receivership property could be found. "As such," the court stated, "the minimum contacts analysis, as a limitation on state extra-territorial power, is simply inapposite." 657 F.2d at 825-26.
The crucial distinction between Haile and the present case is that Haile involved a nationwide service of process statute which was based on the presence of receivership property in the jurisdiction. Such a statute is not before the court in the present case. Instead, section 12 of the Clayton Act must be evaluated under the analysis set forth in Haile. Section 12 provides that venue in an antitrust action is proper "not only in the judicial district whereof it [defendant corporation] is an inhabitant, but also in *622 any district wherein it may be found or transacts business ..." 15 U.S.C. 22.
A second, though related, distinction must also be noted. Haile involved an ancillary receivership action. In contrast, the violations alleged here relate to unfair competition and price discrimination alleged violations of the antitrust laws. The nature or pervasiveness of the injuries alleged in the present case are fundamentally different from those in Haile. Unlike other kinds of finite injuries, the effect of an antitrust violation is not limited to the parties involved in a given transaction. By its own nature, an antitrust violation is more pervasive and intrusive than almost any other type of legal wrong. An underlying concern is the public interest. The welfare of the public as it relates to free competition in the marketplace is vital with any antitrust injury. The sort of injury caused by an antitrust violation played a major factor in the promulgation of section 12 of the Clayton Act. See generally Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 47 S. Ct. 400, 71 L. Ed. 684 (1927).
The suit in Chrysler was brought under the Clayton Act, as in the present case, where nationwide service of process is provided for under section 12. "It may be neither unfair nor unreasonable as a matter of due process [fifth amendment] to aggregate the nonforum contacts of an alien corporate defendant in order to establish personal jurisdiction." 643 F.2d at 1238. The court did not reach this issue because it was not determined whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole to support exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1238-39. Acknowledging that several courts have adopted this aggregate contacts theory of personal jurisdiction, the Sixth Circuit noted that there is no specific statutory authority for it and declined to decide "whether the `aggregate contacts' theory is consistent with the due process of the Fifth Amendment." Id. 041b061a72